Category Archives: Military in politics

Reconciling with Balochistan

South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC’s) first hearings were held at Town Hall in the south eastern city of East London. In one of the hearings, the widows of three anti-apartheid activists of Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (Pebco) affiliated with the United Democratic Front gave testimony. In March 1985, these activists, also known as the Pebco Three, had organised a three-day demonstration to demand an end to apartheid. The authorities thus held them responsible for making Port Elizabeth ‘ungovernable’. A special report on the TRC’s proceedings by journalist Max du Preez narrates, “During the early 1980s, Qaqawuli Godolozi, Sipho Hashe and Champion Galela became targets of the security forces and their families suffered continuous harassment. They last saw their husbands on the 8th of May, 1985, when the Pebco Three mysteriously disappeared. They now accept that their husbands must be dead.” In their testimonies, the widows implored the commission to investigate where their husbands were killed, how they were killed and who killed them. They wanted the commission to reveal the whole truth for them to make peace with their loss.

During the hearings of the TRC, Joe Mamasela, one of the police squad responsible for eliminating anti-apartheid activists in his area, volunteered detailed information of how he and his colleagues detained the three by luring them to come to the airport at Port Elizabeth to receive a fake British diplomat with some cash donations. After successfully apprehending them at the airport, the security police took them to an abandoned police station for interrogation. Mamasela confirmed the interrogation was “…brutal…it was terrible. They were tortured severely; they were savaged; they were brutalised.” When asked about his role in torture, Mamasela replied, “My role was to strangle them and stifle them so that they cannot [sic] make enough noise…” They were eventually killed. Mamasela describes, “Lieutenant Nieuwoudt beat them up with an iron pipe into their heads [sic] so severely that, that…they were kicked; they were punched; they were stomped; they were jumped over their heads [sic], and they were killed.”

Pakistan is not alien to such happenings. Every other day we hear news of disappearances or discovery of tortured, bullet-riddled bodies in different areas of Balochistan. Decades of discrimination, repression and denial of rights to the Baloch people has forced a section of the Baloch youth to take up arms against the highhanded policies of the state. However, those being abducted and killed are moderate, political voices, mostly students, who have nothing to do with the armed insurgency.

Recently, Mian Nawaz Sharif called for an end to the military operation in Balochistan and floated the idea of an All Parties Conference (APC) to hold consultations on the issue. At the outset, the prospects of these baby steps towards resolving an issue that has gone well beyond the realm of institutionalised means of conflict management appear doubtful. The utterly arrogant attitude of the military regime led by General Pervez Musharraf toward the Baloch that culminated in the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 forced the Baloch to rethink their approach of waging the conflict of interests. Instead of relying on political means, a section of the Baloch youth has taken up arms against the state. The radicalisation of the Baloch movement due to the ill-advised policies of the Musharraf regime has made the prospects of peace very bleak. The Baloch insurgents are not fighting for their rights anymore; they want to separate from Pakistan.

In a recent interview to BBC Urdu, veteran Baloch politician and figurative head of his party, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, politely but candidly questioned the efficacy of Pakistna’s political leadership’s efforts for the resolution of Balochistan conflict when the real control is in the hands of the security establishment. The consistency and ferocity with which the military and its affiliates have been carrying out the kill and dump policy, independent of the incumbent government, bear witness to the veteran leader’s assertion.

In the interview, Sardar Ataullah Mengal also spoke of the deep hatred for Pakistan among the Baloch youth. His words reminded me of another interview by BBC Urdu relayed a few months back, in which two female Baloch student activists, whose relatives had been abducted and killed by security forces, spoke of their intense hatred for Pakistan. This sense of estrangement is the fruit of years of brutal repression and denial of rights to the Baloch by the arbiters of this country.

If he is sincere, Mian Nawaz Sharif must also think of how he and his party will deal with the resentment and sense of alienation among the Baloch. Pakistan chose amnesia in case of the excesses committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. It never felt the need to reconcile with the people of its erstwhile eastern wing. Not more than a few words are devoted to the secession of East Pakistan in school/college textbooks. Those responsible for the 1971 debacle led respectable lives and died honourably, setting no example for the future generations of generals and officers. Can amnesia work for Balochistan?

In South Africa, countless others were treated like the Pebco Three during those fateful years in South Africa’s history when the black majority was fighting for its legitimate political, economic and civil rights in the country. Some of the murdered activists’ disfigured bodies were found by their families; others simply disappeared, never to be found. It was only when the TRC, found in 1995 after the end of the apartheid regime, investigated these blind murders and disappearances that the families of the victims found a platform to speak of their trauma and many of the former security and intelligence officials finally confessed to their crimes. The TRC’s thrust was restorative, rather than punitive, laying emphasis on finding the truth and reconciling the former adversaries.

If, by a miracle, Punjab’s leadership is able to ‘rein in’ the military, as Sardar Attaullah Mengal suggested, and the military operation in Balochistan comes to an end, will the security establishment allow the truth to be found, even for the sake of reconciliation and restorative justice? Will the widows, parents, siblings and children of the killed Baloch ever get a chance to speak about the trauma they suffered to be able to reconcile with Pakistan? Will the officers of the Pakistan’s security agencies ever make a public confession like Joe Mamasela: “My role was to strangle them and choke them”?

The writer is a graduate fellow at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and Contributing Editor at Journal of Public and International Affairs. She can be reached at isaleem@syr.edu

(Published in Daily Times on 11 January, 2011)

The Frankenstein’s monster

 

Ishrat Saleem

 

One may find stark similarities between the story of Frankenstein by Mary Shelly and the current situation obtaining in NWFP. In the novel, Victor Frankenstein builds the creature through science and alchemy. The creature is so repulsive and ugly that Frankenstein flees from it in horror and disavows his experiment. Abandoned, frightened, and completely unaware of who or what he is, the monster wanders through the wilderness searching for someone who would understand and shelter him. All his attempt to find a friend are met with horror and disgust at his ‘accursed ugliness’. Heartbroken, he renounces all of humankind and swears revenge on his creator, Frankenstein, for bringing him into the world.A stream of news reports appearing in the press reveals that the situation in the NWFP is extremely alarming. Sixteen Christians were kidnapped by the Taliban from Banaras Town in Peshawar (later released on the intervention of a jirga). Ten girls’ school were set on fire and a soldier was killed and three injured in Swat. Eight drivers who were part of a food convoy were found dead in Kurram Agency last week. The Tehrik-i-Taliban are handing out leaflets warning transporters and drivers of grave consequences if they truck supplies to the Christian army in Afghanistan. Militants in Khar, Bajaur Agency killed two Afghan nationals in public on charges of spying – these are just a few of the recent incidents. Precisely, we are reaping the harvest of what we have sown over the years.
Finding it weak and vulnerable, the Taliban seem bent upon overthrowing the state. They have been carrying out their activities with ease and confidence in Swat, Khyber Agency, North and South Waziristan, Parachinar, Mohmand Agency, Bajaur Agency, Kurram Agency, Khyber Agency, Orakzai Agency, Darra Adam Khel, Tank district and even Peshawar. The other day a news report suggested that the fall of Peshawar into the hands of militants was a matter of time and once that happens the rest of districts will fall like ninepins.
When the military establishment headed by General Ziaul Haq decided to become part of the ‘great game’ to defeat the Soviets, who had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it could never have imagined that one day it would have to face the demons it helped the US create back in 1980s. Having been compelled to withdraw from Vietnam in 1975 after facing defeat, the US had chosen to fight a proxy war in Afghanistan. The US as well as some countries in Middle East funded a network of militant jihadi organisations. A worldwide campaign was launched to induct recruits from the Muslim communities for jihad against Soviet infidels. These would-be jihadis were brought to Pakistan and trained to fight the invading army in Afghanistan. Finally, when the Soviet forces withdrew in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed shortly afterwards due to internal political and economic weaknesses, a huge victory was celebrated. Smug to emerge as a sole superpower, the US left the mujahideen in the lurch and spared little thought to rehabilitating war-ravaged Afghanistan. Infighting between various factions raged during most of the 1990s.
Numerous accounts confirm that the ISI, with chests swelled that its intelligence had brought a superpower down to its knees, believed that India was a fair game and could be bled to death in the same manner, hence the sudden upsurge of militancy in the Indian-held Kashmir. There were simultaneous insurgencies in countries of origin of the mujahideen, including Xinjiang province of China, Central Asia, Africa, Philippines and elsewhere. With militant networks intact, Islamabad decided to facilitate the installation of a friendly regime in Kabul acting on the doctrine of ‘strategic depth’. Thus the Taliban government was installed which was recognised only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE. The Taliban were the children of the madrassas. Indoctrinated in extremist Islam, they had little exposure to human values of modern society and believed in the archaic interpretation of religious texts, which favoured returning to the social set-up of the 7th century which saw the advent of Islam. They believed in imposing their narrow interpretations of Islam through the force of the gun.
The tailor-made madrassah students were good for fighting jihad in Afghanistan, but nobody seems to have spared a thought that they were innocent people, who had the right to education and a chance to lead a normal life. Even after they went out of business, these elements were used by one party or the other to promote their cause. But promoting retrograde values to serve vested interest has its own costs. Feeding a monster also runs the risk of its turning against one’s own self, and this is what seems to have happened.
The Soviet withdrawal had a deep ideological impact on the jihadis, making them believe that they were responsible for this feat. Internationally, militants networks consolidated, the leading being al Qaeda, and carried out successful terrorist attacks around the world, the most notable being one in the US on September 11, 2001. Finding itself under attack, the US decided to take out al Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan, which had the Taliban government’s protection. It was then that Pakistan had to take a difficult decision of severing close links with the Taliban and throw in its lot with the US. Pakistan was also compelled to launch an operation in the tribal area to take out militants using the area as a base to launch attack across the border.
There may have been many tactical as well as strategic mistakes in a U-turn in this policy, which has landed us into the current situation. Lt. Gen. (retd.) Orakzai, who oversaw the first deployment of troops, was in favour of negotiations to carry out the operation in collaboration with local supporters. However, this strategy was abandoned in favour of a full-fledged military operation, but soon the military found itself surrounded by the hostile populace and no sources of intelligence. It suffered heavy casualties and bombed indiscriminately whenever it did. Anti-American sentiments raged in the area and the local breed of Taliban systematically decimated the pro-maliks, who were crucial to the system of governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). While on the one hand, the government was busy making enemies of its erstwhile friends, on the other hand, after the initial crackdown on militant outfits in the country, the government allowed them to resurface and operate with new names. It also embarked upon a campaign to defend the institution of madrassa in the West. Analysts and close watchers of the situation argued that the government followed a dual strategy – saving the Taliban (with whom it had close ties) and taking out al Qaeda (the foreign elements). The government failed to calculated that touching al Qaeda would automatically evoke reaction from their hosts, the Taliban. The Lal Masjid incident in Islamabad should have served as an eye-opener that the erstwhile protégé had become independent of the mentor’s tutelage and was out to take on its creator. The much-delayed and the ill-conceived military operation on Lal Masjid and its fallout in the form of suicide bombings throughout the country have revealed that the mosque administration was closely associated with Baitullah Mehsood in NWFP. They were armed with sophisticated weapons and were confident that the government would not dare touch them. It was due to this confidence that they openly kidnapped ordinary people as well as security personnel in the heart of the capital. The situation is made much more complex by the fact that the militants in NWFP have been accused of using the area as a base to launch cross-border attacks on the coalition forces in Afghanistan, which has irked the US and Afghan government to issue threats of hot pursuit.

Unfortunately, at the time of Soviet-Afghan war and subsequently during Kashmir insurgency, so much investment was made to prepare the people to support and volunteer for jihad within Pakistan that they are still unable to make a distinction between lawful and unlawful. There are deep fissures in government, the media as well as the people’s perception on the issue of militancy. The jihadis have support among religious and right-of-centre political parties, the media, the government institutions, including the army itself. This is evident in their outreach and ratio of success in suicide bombings, which saw a steep rise after the Lal Masjid operation. They have struck at the place and time of their choosing, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. They have taken the entire society hostage. But the Pakistani public in general has still not been able to make up its mind that militancy is unlawful and dangerous. It runs the risk of decimating moderate sections of society by the force of gun, just like the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. There is also the perception that Pakistan is fighting a foreign war. This inherent confusion about the role of militants and now a fear of their demonstrated ability of persecution seems to be weakening the resolve of law enforcement agencies to fight them.

In this situation, the elected government finds itself in a fix. This is exhibited in the lack of coordination between the central and the provincial governments and conflicting statements by various government functionaries. The government is still holding out an olive branch to the militants in the province, who know they are negotiating from a position of strength. One may find solace in the government’s announcement of a three-pronged strategy of using political influence of elected representatives for holding peace talks, military effort to deal with recalcitrant elements and socio-economic uplift of the militancy-prone areas to isolate extremist elements. However, it is difficult to say whether the inherent confusion and divisions among our state institutions, political parties, media and the public will allow any efforts to curb militancy to succeed.

 

To conclude, it is the responsibility of the state to provide security to the citizens against militant activities. But do the powers-that-be recognise the dangers they have posed to the society and even the state itself by letting the monster of militancy grow out of proportion? One might ask whose interests are the militants serving when they go out and burn girls’ schools and CDs and barbers’ shops? Is the government (read the establishment) sincere in its resolve to fight extremism and militancy it once promoted with zeal?

Ex-servicemen’s activism

Ishrat Saleem

President General (retd.) Pervez Musharraf’s graph of popularity has been on a constant decline since he moved the presidential reference against the Chief Justice; it received a fatal blow when he imposed a state of emergency on November 3, 2007, clamped restrictions on the media and deposed more than 60 judges of high courts and the Supreme Court to save himself from being disqualified as the president by the court. General (retd.) Musharraf’s influence considerably declined when the party which he had built as his political face was routed in the elections. Although the president still persists that he will react if parliament tries to slash his powers or impeach him, several recent developments attest to the fact that politically President General (retd.) Pervez Musharraf is on a ventilator.

The most interesting among these is an expression of favour for democratic values by the ex-servicemen, who have been part of many a contentious decision during the current and previous military regimes. In January this year, prominent generals came under the banner of Pakistan Ex-Servicemen’s Society (ESS) and asked the newly retired President General Musharraf to resign in the “supreme national interest”. This initiative was spearhead by Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti of Ziaul Haq regime fame. Their demands have crescendoed of late and offer some food for thought. On June 2, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani gave an interview to a television channel and made some stunning revelations along with demand for probe into the Kargil Operation, plane conspiracy case, missing persons, Lal Masjid Operation and imposition of emergency on November 3. On June 7, the ESS demanded a judicial trial of President General (retd.) Musharraf for the Kargil debacle in a press conference. The ex-servicemen have also expressed support for the lawyers’ movement and made it is a point to mark their presence in the long march. In fact, they announced they would set up a permanent camp outside parliament – even if the lawyers had decided to end the long march – and demand the ouster of President Musharraf.

It would be interesting to analyse the credentials of these luminaries who suddenly found is expedient to put on the mantle of ‘civil society’ and look for the reasons that prompted them to make this move now. Lt. Gen. Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani was serving in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at the time of the Kargil Operation. Immediately after the successful military coup against the elected government on October 12, 1999, he was made commander of the 10th Corp. After his retirement in 2004, he was made head of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). In November 2007, through the provisional constitutional order, the president made an amendment in the constitution to reduce the tenure of the head of FPSC from five years to three year, effectively sending Lt. Gen. (retd.) Kiyani home. By this time, Musharraf had already weeded out most of his fellow coup-makers from the system he was heading.

Many of the things Lt. Gen. (retd.) Kiyani said in his interview call for a closer examination. He said that his real differences with Musharraf started after 9/11. One might argue that the differences between Lt. Gen. (retd.) Kiyani and the president started when, as head of the government, Musharraf took decisions which hurt the long-term interests of the military, e.g. a U-turn on Afghan policy that was based on the doctrine of strategic depth and a reduction in militancy in Kashmir. On the other hand, it also means that Lt. Gen. (retd.) Kiyani tacitly supports the illegitimate act of overthrowing an elected government in a coup in 1999. During the interview he went so far as to suggest that the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif should have waited for Chief of Army Staff to return from Sri Lanka to remove him from office. While religious parties and a dominant part of the vernacular press have hailed Lt. Gen. (retd.) Kiyani’s statement that instead of surrendering to the American threats after September 11, 2001, Pervez Musharraf had the option of holding a referendum to ascertain the will of the people, it is questionable if such a thing was possible at that time. It easier said than done that after 9/11, Musharraf should have stood against Washington, given the intensity of international pressure and the kaleidoscopic speed with which the events were taking place. The UN Security Council had passed resolutions on September 12 and September 28 calling for a stance against terrorism and anti-terrorism respectively. India had already offered support to the coalition for war against terror. The tremendous pressure under which the Musharraf regime decided to go along can also be gauged from the excerpts of exchanges between General Musharraf and Secretary of State Collin Powel as well as those between US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmad. Therefore, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Kiyani’s assertions in this regard should be interpreted as nothing more than appealing to popular sentiments against the US and the war on terror.

It is unfortunate that ex-servicemen’s explanation of religious extremism as presented by Lt. Gen. (retd.) Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani derives its inspiration from the logic put forth by the Musharraf coterie in delaying the Lal Masjid operation and failing to tackle extremist outfits throughout the country. In the interview, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Kiyani said that the suicide attacks escalated after operation on Lal Masjid in July 2007, in which many innocent students were killed. In calling for a probe into the operation, he conveniently ignored the activities of the students of the twin seminaries from January to July and the very fact that they started openly challenging the writ of the state in the heart of the capital when the Lal Masjid administration was issued notices for vacating the madrassah built on encroached land. Musharraf supporters as well as his opponents fail to mention – for their own expedient reasons – how the Lal Masjid administration used innocent children as hostages during the operation. Lt. Gen. (retd.) Kiyani’s call for a probe could again be interpreted as a populist stance meant to resonate with the public rather than a principled and honest opinion on the issue.

Analysts believe that the damage to the image of army as an institution during Musharraf’s nine-year rule is being viewed with grave concern by the serving and retired military officials. To keep an upper hand in the political process in the country, it is necessary to restore a positive image of the army in the eyes of the public. With Musharraf’s rule going through its last leg, when he does not enjoy support in any section of society, his stay in power can cause further damage to the army’s reputation. Therefore, sacrificing Musharraf for saving the institutional interests of the military would not be a bad deal. It is not then a coincidence that going by popular sentiment, the ex-servicemen have joined the chorus of ending army’s intervention in politics. Since assuming charge as the Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani has paid special attention to restoring the image of the military. The calling of serving officers from civilian institutions was a step in this direction. The statement of Lt. Gen. (retd.) Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani that Musharraf should be made an example to prevent the emergence of future dictators should be taken with a pinch of salt. Interviews such as these appear to be a PR exercise rather than a change of heart of these gentlemen.

Since the struggle for the restoration of judiciary took off last year, many questions have been asked regarding the role of military in politics. It is for the first time in the history of Pakistan that the military’s misdoings have been so consistently and openly condemned in the public with the call to end military’s intervention in national affairs. The ex-servicemen’s organisation could well be a reaction to the lawyers’ movement. The latest recruit to the society is the former governor of Sindh and the former Minister of Interior, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Moinuddin Haider. Commenting on ex-servicemen’s activism in her article (‘The wannabe heroes’ Dawn, June 13, 2008), Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua, author of Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, argued that this is the natural consequence of entrenchment of military in politics. According to her, the serving and retired officers and a few civilians, whose interests are associated with it, are all part of the ‘military establishment’. In the absence of institutional mechanisms for internal dialogue, opinions of different lobbies within the military establishment are given voice through the media and ex-servicemen. These do not represent the independent views of these individuals but reflect a deepening of friction within the military establishment. The retired officers serve as the informal conduit for reaching out to the public or conveying views of one section of the establishment to the other through the media. She cautions the discerning onlooker to analyse the real intent of these people, which is not upholding of democracy. They struck when Musharraf is most vulnerable and sat silent when the incidents on which they are showing their reservations now were taking place.

Here, a brief look at the credential of members ESS and would be in order. Lt. Gen. (retd.) Faiz Ali Chisti, the author of Betrayal of Another Kind, was the Corp Commander based in Rawalpindi at the time of the coup in July 1977. In his book he claims that “he was in charge of planning the take over in the capital and it went off like clockwork.” Another prominent name is General (retd.) Mirza Aslam Beg, who has publicly admitted to his role in manipulating the election of 1990 (although he is now rumoured to have left the ESS on the plea that it is headed by a lower ranking ex-servicemen!). Then there is Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, former head the ISI, whose ties with the Taliban are well known and who has also admitted to political manoeuvring. General Lt. Gen. (retd.) Asad Durrani is also the former head of the ISI. These gentlemen have an entrenched view of Pakistan as a security state as opposed to a welfare state. Their views on terrorism, national security, regional peace, human development, economic globalisation, provincial autonomy, etc. conflict with those of liberal democratic forces. Their model of an ideal state favours constant external frictions and an authoritative state structure. In the face of the fact that Musharraf is counting his days in the president’s office, the signs of the presence of a powerful military establishment that is not ready to let go of the power it has exercised in national affairs for long does not bode well. Pakistan ill-affords to continue with this configuration of power, as people are becoming more organised and aware and would not put up with a weak elected government for long, which is unable to take decisions on issues of critical importance.

Post Benazir Bhutto – dark on your heels

 

Ishrat Saleem

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto has put a big question mark on the future of the country. Being leader of the largest political party of Pakistan that represents the left-of-centre political ideology, at least in theory, the person of Benazir Bhutto was one of the centres of gravity in a limited political spectrum of the country, which never grew beyond a few notable names and political organisations due to repeated military interventions. Among these political forces, a majority, at one time, was spawned by the establishment for its own parochial purposes and hardly meets the normative standards of the political leadership. Whoever has hit Benazir, has inadvertently rocked the very foundation of the body politic in this country. It will be after a great difficulty and long effort that the country would recover from the wound that has been inflicted on it. Or will the matters go worse?

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With the country plunged in what could be described as civil war in two of its provinces and the extremist violence reminding us of its hideous presence every now and then through suicide bombings carried out every few days in one part of the country or the other, it was hoped that the elections would propel the political process and lead to a political solution of our problems, garner public support and generate consensus for the military action where it was essential. It is a foregone conclusion that the al Qaeda and Taliban extremists cannot be taken out without the use of force with a strong political behind this action. The extremists have gained such influence and outreach that they are almost confident of winning the war against the state of Pakistan. But, given the divisions in society, state agencies and political elite over this issue, it is not possible to launch an effective operation without building consensus. For its willingness to take on al Qaeda and Taliban operating from the Frontier province and its large public following, the PPP seemed a perfect candidate to do this job.

There are alarmist interpretations as well as uncertain analyses of the prospects of democracy in Pakistan when the fundamentalist extremist are hell-bent upon overthrowing the government through terrorism and force. A lot of questions are being raised about the ability of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and by implication, the country, to survive this crisis. Is there any other force on the political scene, which would take up the gauntlet thrown by the extremists?

Having always been a loose organisation, its internal politics has revolved around personalities. It has maintained its dynastic character and more votes are cast in its favour in the name of Bhutto rather than its ideology and philosophy of governance. Benazir Bhutto was the ‘life-chairperson’ of the PPP, obliterating any prospects of democratic politics within the party. Likewise, the central, provincial and lower tier party leaders were nominated rather than elected. In the same manner, at the time of elections, party tickets were awarded to the close gamut of electables, which has always been very fluid except the top party leadership.

Despite these shortcomings, the PPP has a large following of staunch supporters, known as jayalas precisely because of this quality.

Regardless of the number of seats won by PPP, the total number of votes cast to it throughout the country has always remained somewhere around 25 percent of the net total. In a loose party structure, it is always a strong central leadership which acts as a binding force.

Benazir Bhutto remained the undisputed leader of the PPP for good 28 years after the execution of her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, at the hand of General Ziaul Haq, in 1979, despite her brother Mir Murtaza Bhutto. Although she had to wait for another eight year to come of age to be able contest for the slot of the prime minister, she ran party affairs with her mother as the ceremonial head of the party. Conforming to the tradition of dynastic politics, in her will, Benazir Bhutto nominated her husband Asif Ali Zardari as the chairperson of the party in the event of her death. In a wise move, keeping in view the sentiments of party supporters, who have deep affiliation with Bhuttos as their leaders, Zardari not only decided to make his 19-year old son, Bilawal, the chairperson of the party, he also announced that from now on, all his three children will add Bhutto to their names. Zaridari will look after party affairs till his son comes of age. The young scion has still 2-3 years to go to complete his education at Oxford and six years before he could run for elections. It will be 16 years before he would run for premiership. Although the Central Executive Committee of the PPP has unanimously endorsed the decision, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari is still an unproven leader of a very big vote bank. He is still to get himself recognised as an independent political leader. In the meanwhile, Asif Ali Zardari, who is now the co-chairperson, will be the virtual leader of the PPP.

Riding on the wave of sympathy, the party may win majority in the upcoming election and form a government. However, how the party will conduct its affairs without a strong central leader for a long time to come, is a serious question.

Unfortunately, Asif Ali Zardari does not have spotless credentials. In the two stints of Benazir Bhutto in the office of the prime minister, Zardari was reported to have indulged in the most unscrupulous forms of financial corruption, which earned him the title of Mr. Ten Percent and corruption cases at home and several courts abroad. He remained incarcerated for 11 years, first during Nawaz Sharif’s rule, and later during the tenure of General (retired) Pervez Musharraf. The general not only continued to pursue the cases filed by the Nawaz government, he brought more cases against the couple through investigations by a special cell in the National Accountability Bureau, specially created for this purpose. With such a history, it would be a lot more easier for his opponents to discredit Asif Ali Zardari as the top leader of the party without Benazir at her aid. It is questionable whether Mr. Zardari possess the ability and political acumen to capitalise on the lady luck of mass support that smiles on the party fortunes due to the unfortunate death of its leader and strengthen party ranks. Once the wave of public sympathy subsides, Asif Ali Zardari may face serious challenges to his leadership from within and outside the party. In that event, the PPP will be practically paralysed to deal with the challenges confronting Pakistan. The PPP may form a majority government after the upcoming elections, it remains to be seen if it will be able to assume the political leadership of the country.

Political activist and Professor of Physics at the Quaid-e-Azam University, Dr. A. H. Nayyar commented, “Asif Ali Zardari will have to part from his legacy and show sagacity and poise if he wishes to win confidence of party leaders and the people and carve out a place for himself.”

Other than the PPP, no political party claims the same following among the masses nor leadership nor the ideology to assert that they can deal with the crises confronting Pakistan. President Musharraf’s handmaiden/protégé, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) (Q), does not boast liberal credentials as is evident from the role it played in the Lal Masjid crisis. Comprising largely the remnants of the late General Ziaul Haq, important leaders within the party have deep sympathies with the jihadi elements. In riding on the coattails of President Musharraf, the PML (Q) leadership has been compelled to reiterate the “enlightened moderate” sentiments of fight against terrorism uttered by him on several occasions. But this has the potential to pit them against the extremists, who consider anyone who opposes them or does not support them, as their enemy.

There is leadership crisis across the political spectrum. Director Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and senior journalist, I. A. Rehman commented, “Leadership crisis is not confined to the PPP. Every party is a victim to this crisis. Military interventions has not allowed the political process to continue through which new leadership emerges and get polished.”

PML (N) is no different from PML (Q). It is clearly a right-of-centre party, which to date has failed to exhibit any trait of leadership that can understand the threat posed to the country and has the intelligence and ability to deal with it. With a trader class vote-bank, Mian Nawaz Sharif may not think it advisable to hurt the sensibilities his voters by taking a strident position against the jihadi extremists.

The only other party that has come out openly against the al Qaeda and the Taliban is Muttahidda Quomi Movement (MQM). However, MQM’s own credentials are questionable, because it has been operating as a mafia since its inception and only recently showed its armed muscle on May 12, when the Chief Justice went there to address the Sindh High Court Bar Association. Moreover, it is confined to urban Sindh and pursues parochial interests.

This leaves us with small nationalist parties which conduct their politics on ethnic grounds and lack a national base, and religio-political parties whose sympathies and role in training and promoting the jihadis are well known.

In these circumstances, the basic question boils down to the military supremacy over civilian discourse which has stultified the political process and landed us in the position we are in. We are in the grip of religious militancy which threatens to disintegrate the state and establish a Taliban-style regime. In the failure of the state to resolve this basic question, the issues of the development of the people have been completely sidelined. This winter, we are facing the worst-ever power crisis. The wheat is selling at exorbitant price, while the country which once used to export cotton, cannot meet the domestic need of its textile industry. But the logic of the circumstances is pointing towards the inevitable direction, where extremists will be on one side and the state and society on the other. As far as the emergence of genuine political leadership with the ability to take the nation forward is concerned, it seems that the people of this country may have to cool their heels for quite some time to come.